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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Cassidy H. Stone appeals from her conviction by a jury for battery on a health care

worker, arguing that the

district court erred

by excluding testimony regarding her reputation

for

peacefulness.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

Proceedings

In July of 2018, Cassidy Stone attempted suicide in her

Ambien

drinking alcohol, and cutting her wrists.

pills,

to enter the

home by banging 0n

door, and Stone

at

was taken

Kootenai Health.

t0 the

(R., p.13.)

home by

taking roughly twenty

When

her eX-boyfriend tried

(PSI, p.4.)

the door, neighbors called police, the police broke

emergency room.

She was

(PSI, p.4.)

inebriated, belligerent,

bed and leaving.

(R., p.13; State’s

EX.

1,

the

She was placed 0n a police hold
and angry, repeatedly referred

the nurses and hospital staff attending to her as “bitches,” and insisted

hospital

down

0n

00:00 — 01:32; State’s EX.

getting

2,

t0

up from the

06:00 — 11:00.1)

Nurse Sarah Gonzales was one of the nurses preventing Stone from leaving and was the hospital
staff

member

needed
L.7

1

taking a central role in trying to reason with Stone and convince her that she

to return to her

— p.6,

L.21.2)

bed

When

for her

own

safety.

(R., p.13; State’s

EX.

1,

00:00 — 01:32;

T11, p.5,

Stone became particularly aggressive towards Nurse Gonzales and

lifted

body-cam Video from an ofﬁcer 0n scene and is in the record as a ﬁle titled
“Schatz Body Cam.” State’s EX. 2 is a Video from a camera in the examination room 0f the
hospital and is in the record in a ﬁle titled “KH Video.” Only the former includes audio. Both
were admitted at trial and published t0 the jury. (TL, p.206, Ls.1-18; p.270, L.22 — p.238, L25;
State’s EX.

1

is

a

p.315, Ls.16-25.)
2

The ﬁle

titled “Transcripts

— Volume

1

— Stone.pdf”

contains the transcript of the preliminary

hearing (TL, pp.1-20), the transcript 0f the hearing 0n the state’s motion in limine (TL, pp.2133), the transcript

hearing

(Tr.,

0f the two-day jury

trial (T12,

pp.34-395), and the transcript 0f the sentencing

pp.396-420). Page references are to the pagination of the ﬁle as a whole.

her leg, placing

it

Seconds

01:20.)

0n the edge 0f the bed, Stone was warned not
later,

Nurse Gonzales and several hospital

(State’s EX.

to kick.

staff

1,

members attempted

01 10
:

t0

—

move

Stone back onto the bed, and Stone responded by twisted her body and kicking Nurse Gonzales
twice in the face. (R., p.13; Tr., p.
10:45

—

6,

L.22 — p.7, L.4; State’s EX.

1,

01:20 — 01:30; State’s EX.

2,

10:52.3)

Following a preliminary hearing and ﬁnding 0f probable cause
charged With battery 0n a health care worker under Idaho Code

The

state

ﬁled a motion in limine arguing that the

§

(R., pp.23-26),

18-915C

district court

Stone was

(R., pp.28-29).

should exclude various

evidence, including “[a]ny reference t0 the fact that the defendant does not have a criminal

history 0r has led a law abiding life.” (R., pp.43-44.)

At a hearing on

the motion, Stone did not

object to the exclusion 0f evidence regarding Stone’s clean criminal record and law abiding

life,

but contended that she should be allowed to “introduce character evidence in the form of
reputation 0r opinion.”

(TL, p.27, Ls.6-22.)

The

state

responded that

its

motion

in limine

was

not addressed to testimony regarding a reputation for peacefulness and that the parties would

“have to address [the admissibility of character evidence] during

The court entered an order addressing

the state’s motion.

trial.”

(T12, p.31,

(R., pp.65-73.)

Ls.10-16.)

In pertinent part,

excluded evidence regarding Stone’s clean criminal record and law abiding

life,

it

but did not

address the admissibility 0f evidence regarding her “general reputation for peacefulness.”

(R.,

p.68.)

At
(T12,

3

trial,

the state

moved

p.141, Ls.6-18; p.144, L.11

Though

there

Nurse Gonzales.

is

n0 audio,

t0 exclude testimony regarding Stone’s character as irrelevant.

— p.145,

L.18.) Stone responded that she should be permitted t0

State’s EX. 2 provides a particularly clear

View 0f Stone kicking

introduce testimony regarding her reputation under Idaho Rule 0f Evidence 404 because her

“character for peacefulness, non-Violence, not Violent, not quarrelsome

intent in this case.”

district court

(T12,

p.142, L.14

— p.144,

L.17.)

After reviewing a

(Tr.,

p.146, L.23

— p.155,

L.3.)

the Victim.

intend, for

(TL, p.151, L.17

—

p.153, L22.)

know

Rather,

cases, the

that battery is a

that the act is illegal or intend

it is

sufﬁcient that the defendant

whatever reason, “a forceful or Violent contact with the other person” 0r a “touching

0r striking 0f another person against the Will of the other.”

(internal quotation

marks omitted).)

(TL, p.151, L.17

The court then concluded

be relevant.

She

(TL, p.153, L.23
reiterated her

View

—

p.154, L.8.)

that she should

On

the second day of

—

p.153, L.22

facts “in this

under the

that,

particular case,” testimony regarding a reputation for peacefulness in the

again.

number of

The court emphasized

general intent crime that does not require that the defendant

harm

relevant to the issue of

concluded that testimony regarding Stone’s reputation for peacefulness was not

relevant in this case.

t0

is

community would not
Stone raised the issue

trial,

be permitted under Idaho Rule 0f Evidence 404(a)

and non-Violence.

to present testimony regarding her reputation for peacefulness

(TL, p.226,

L.17 — p.234, L.6.) The court again held that the evidence would not be relevant under the facts

of the case and because battery

The

is

a general intent crime. (TL, p.238, L.15

state called three witnesses:

Whose body-cam recorded some of the
Nurse Gonzales testiﬁed

0n her

feet,

Stone’s

and

own

that she

safety

was

L.13.)

Nurse Gonzales; Ofﬁcer Christopher Schatz, the ofﬁcer

events;

that Stone

and Kody Wright, a hospital security guard.

was

trying to leave her hospital room,

trying t0 convince Stone t0 remain in her

and because she was on a police hold.

testiﬁed that Stone appeared intoxicated,

“aggressive,” and

— p.242,

(T12,

was “very unsteady,

was “making threatening remarks

room and on her bed

p.162, L.23
9’

C6

wobbly,

t0 the entire staff

was unsteady

and

99

— p.163,
C6

L.1

1.)

for

She

not very rational,”

telling us she

wanted

t0 leave.” (TL, p.166, L.5

— p.167,

L.7; p.169, L.23

— p.170,

Ls.5-21.)

After trying to convince Stone to remain in the

other staff

members attempted

16.)

With Stone now on her back 0n

when Stone

room and

her onto her bed for her

the bed,

— p.174,

L.5; p.200,

return t0 her bed, she and

own

safety.

(T12,

p.167, Ls.8-

Nurse Gonzalez was standing above Stone’s waist

“pulled her knees up to her chest,”

and kicked Nurse Gonzales twice

—

move

t0

L.2; p.173, L.23

in the face.

swung her

(T12,

legs

p.168, L.4

up and towards Nurse Gonzales,

— p.169,

L.13; State’s EX. 2, 10:45

10:52.)

Ofﬁcer Schatz testiﬁed
staff.

(TL, p.203, L.15

Nurse Gonzales.
thereafter

striking

when

—

that Stone

p.204, L.16.)

(TL, p.208, Ls.3-21.)

she

was

He

“yelling,

‘6

cursing,” and threatening the hospital

testiﬁed that Stone threatened t0 throw her shoe at

Stone was warned not t0 kick

was moved back onto her bed, she

one of the nurses in the face.”

9’

“rolled

(TL, p.203, L.15

—

staff,

but very shortly

on her back, kicking her legs up,

p.204, L.16.)

He

testiﬁed that

it

appeared t0 him that Stone was intentionally aiming for and attempting t0 kick Nurse Gonzales.
(TL, p.212, L.25

— p.213,

L.7; p.215, Ls.5-16.)

He testiﬁed that

Stone was consistently angry and

aggressive. (TL, p.204, Ls.17-21.)

Kody Wright
to

calm Stone and

testiﬁed that Nurse Gonzales and other hospital staff

to explain to her

why

she

was

her bed, While Stone responded with profanity.

t0

move

there and

(Tr.,

p.262, L.5

(Tr.,

p.264, L.25

—

p.265, L.18; p.267, Ls.2-8.)

her body, twisted her hips” and appeared t0 target or aim

He

trying

important that she return to

— p.264,

L.24.)

When they tried

her back to the bad, she “rolled onto her back and started kicking directly at Nurse

Gonzales.”

17.)

why it was

members were

at

Wright testiﬁed

Nurse Gonzales.

testiﬁed that she kicked at Nurse Gonzales three times,

that Stone “turned

(T12, p.3 12,

making contact With her

Ls.12-

twice.

— p.267,

(TL, p.266, L.21

L.1.)

After kicking Nurse Gonzales, Stone continued to ﬁght as

Wright and Ofﬁcer Schatz attempted

The

state

concluded

its

to

subdue

her. (TL, p.267, L.9

presentation 0f evidence

by playing

— p.268,

L.18.)

State’s Exhibits

1

and 2—the

two Videos 0f the events—for the jury. (TL, p.315, Ls.16-25.)

The only evidence presented by

the defense

was Stone’s testimony. She

remembered taking prescription Ambien and drinking Wine, waking up
hours in the hospital, but that she did not remember any 0f the events
case.

and

(TL, p.319, L.18

that this

— p.320, L25.) She

was “one 0f the only times”

on the testimony introduced by the

state

that she called hospital staff “bitches”

testiﬁed that she

in the early

at issue in

morning

her criminal

testiﬁed that she “blacked out” (TL, p.326, Ls.3-14)

that she has ever

done so

(T12,

p.331. Ls.9-12). Based

and Viewing the Videos 0f the incident, she speculated

because she was angry, anxious, scared, “unaware of what

[was] going 0n,” thought she “was at [her] house and there’s strangers there,” and “was trying t0
get out 0f the situation.” (TL, p.330, Ls.2-21.) Though, again, she claimed not t0

remember any

0f the events, she speculated that she kicked Nurse Gonzales by accident when she was trying to
get off 0f the bed.

(TL, p.332, L.23

—

p.335, L.1.)

She acknowledged, though,

that because she

could not remember the events, she could not “accurately” say What she was 0r was not trying t0

do when she kicked Nurse Gonzales. (TL, p.335, Ls.2-21.)
In closing, the state argued that the question before the jury

Miss Gonzales

in the face

the Videos” that that

was

kicked Nurse Gonzales,
(TL, p.377, L.21

the case.

it

— p.378,

on purpose” and

that

it

was “obvious from

(TL, p.366, L.4

—

p.369, L.21.)

was an accident and she was only
L.1.)

was Whether Stone “kick[ed]
all

the testimony and

Stone argued

that,

from

while she

trying to trying t0 get out 0f the bed.

The jury returned a

guilty verdict.

(TL, p.390, L.14

—

p.391, L.6; R., p.136.)

court suspended a uniﬁed sentence of two years, with one year ﬁxed, in favor of

probation. (R., pp.146-49.) Stone timely appealed. (R., pp.154-56.)

The

district

two years of

IS SUE

Stone states the issue 0n appeal

Did

the district court err

when

as:

it

excluded evidence on Ms. Stone’s character for

peacefulness, because that character
the requisite culpable state 0f mind to

was relevant to Whether Ms. Stone had
commit a battery?

trait

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Stone established

that the district court erred

reputation for peacefulness and, even if so,

was any such

by excluding testimony regarding her

error harmless?

ARGUMENT
The

District

Court Did Not

Commit

Reversible Error

BV Excluding Testimony Regarding

Stone’s Reputation For Peacefulness

A.

Introduction

The

was not

district court

determined that testimony regarding Stone’s reputation for peacefulness

relevant in this case.

That determination was not

error.

nature 0f the conduct alleged here, as well as the fact that the state

Instead,

it

follows from the

was not required

to

prove that

Stone acted maliciously or With any intent to cause harm. In particular, Stone was signiﬁcantly

inebriated—in

fact,

had “blacked out”—and she was

which she was being detained against her

will,

was

in a highly unusual, stressful situation in

resisting,

and was trying

to escape.

Though

testimony that Stone had a reputation for peacefulness might well have been relevant t0 a battery
charge alleging

in less unusual circumstances, Stone maliciously attacked

that,

was not

relevant under these circumstances.

instigated a ﬁght,

it

mistaken and the

district court erred, the error

overwhelmingly established
face,

was harmless.

that Stone purposefully

But even

if that

someone 0r
conclusion

The properly admitted evidence

and repeatedly kicked Nurse Gonzales

in the

and the probative value of testimony regarding Stone’s reputation for peaceful

vanishingly small, if

it

has any probative value at

all.

There

is

is

no reasonable

is

possibility that the

exclusion of testimony regarding Stone’s reputation for peacefulness contributed to the verdict.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The

court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and

trial

decision to admit 0r exclude evidence Will be reversed only

that discretion.

State V.

When there

its

has been a clear abuse of

Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001). However,

“[t]his

Court’s standard of review 0n issues 0f relevance

is

de novo.” State

V.

Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219,

16 P.3d 890, 895 (2000).

The

C.

District

Court Correctly Determined That Testimony Regarding Stone’s Reputation

Was Not Admissible Under Idaho

For Peacefulness

Rule

Of Evidence

404(a)

Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a) generally precludes the introduction of testimony
regarding “a person’s character 0r

accordance With

on a

it

Where

is

of character” as evidence that he 0r she acted in

particular occasion.

that a criminal “defendant

evidence

trait

may

exception, the rule provides

offer evidence of the defendant’s pertinent

admitted, the prosecutor

pertinent, the defendant

As an

I.R.E. 404(a)(1).

may

offer evidence t0 rebut

may provide

evidence 0f the

or her reputation in the community, and not

is

(Ct.

and

I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(A).

if the

Even

m

only through testimony as t0 his

by testimony regarding speciﬁc

Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155, 730 P.2d 1069, 1075
through speciﬁc instances 0f good conduct

trait

it.”

trait,

acts.4

E

App. 1986) (“[P]roof of good character

impermissible under both the rules and general case

law”).

Not

all

0f defendant’s alleged character

traits will

criminal prosecution and under I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(A).

relate to a pertinent trait

be “pertinent” in the context of a

“[A]s the rule speciﬁes, the evidence must

0f the [defendant’s] character. That

is,

the character evidence

must be

relevant t0 a material issue in the case.” State V. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742,

749

(Ct.

App. 1999);

App. 2013).

4

As

is

ﬂ
true

also State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 130,

defense” in Which case
Stone’s character

contend otherwise.

it

is

(Ct.

0f relevance generally, whether testimony regarding the defendant’s

Unless the defendant’s character 0r character

405.

294 P.3d 1137, 1142

may be proved by

trait “is

an essential element of a charge, claim, 0r

“speciﬁc instances 0f the person’s conduct.” I.R.E.

not an element of any charge, claim, or defense, and Stone does not

reputation

relevant depends

is

“The prevailing View

murder might show

that

he

ed.) (footnotes omitted).

character from

character

peaceable, but not Vice versa.”

is

“While

charged—are

might offer evidence 0f honesty, While someone accused of

theft

it

which the jury may

may be

the crime charged, the facts, and the parties’ arguments.

that only pertinent traits—those involved in the offense

is

One charged With

provable.

upon

true that an accused

is

infer that

offered only so long as

it

1

McCormick On

may

EVid. § 191 (8th

offer evidence of his

good

m

he did not commit the crime charged, such good

pertains to the trait involved in the charge.”

Altamirano, 569 P.2d 233, 235 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that evidence regarding defendant’s lawful

employment and non-use 0f narcotics was not

pertinent to prosecution for sale 0f narcotics).

also United States V. Santana—Camacho, 931

character as “a

good family man” and

E

F.2d 966, 967-68 (lst Cir.1991) (evidence 0f

as “a kind person”

was inadmissible because

it

was not

probative With respect t0 the conduct alleged in the case—the illegal transportation of aliens into

the country); United States V. Hill, 4O F.3d 164, 169 (7th Cir.1994) (“laW-abidingness” not a

“pertinent character trait” related to charges 0f dealing in cash and checks); State V. Sguire, 364

S.E.2d 354, 357 (N.C. 1988) (defendant “must tailor the evidence t0 a particular

trait that is

relevant t0 an issue in the case”).

Stone contends that testimony regarding her reputation for peacefulness was relevant as
evidence that she did not intend t0

The

district court rej ected that

(T12,

district court

was

p.146, L.23

correct

is

contact With Nurse Gonzales. (Appellant’s brief, p.18.)

argument below and correctly concluded that testimony regarding

Stone’s reputation for peacefulness

the charge.

make

was not

relevant under the facts of this case and the nature of

— p.155, L3; p.238, L.15 — p.242,

t0 contrast the cases cited

10

L.13.)

One way

by Stone on appeal With

t0 see that the

this case.

As

Stone notes, Idaho case law addressing the admissibility 0f character evidence under I.R.E.
404(a)(2) in a prosecution for battery

is

sparse and Stone does not cite any Idaho cases

0n

(Appellant’s brief, p.155) Stone turns instead t0 case law from other jurisdictions, citing

FLﬁti, 513 P.2d 697 (Haw. 1973), State
348 So.2d 663

V. Ervin,

App. 1977).6 (Appellant’s

(Fla. Ct.

451 P.2d 372 (Utah 1969), Seabrook
brief, pp.15-16.) In Faaﬁti, the

m
point.

V. State,

defendant was

charged With aggravated battery in association with a ﬁght outside of a bar. FLﬁti, 513 P.2d
699.

In

Elm,

commit robbery when

Elm,

home.

When
that

it

was charged With

the defendant

it

451 P.2d

was alleged

was alleged

at 373.

that

that

weapon with

he pistol-whipped and robbed a

In Seabrook, the defendant

he argued With his

he meant business.”

assault With a deadline

at

intent to

outside of her

was charged With aggravated

and then shot her with a shotgun

sister

Seabrook, 348 So.2d

woman

at

to

battery

“show her

633-64 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Each of those cases addresses the admissibility of testimony regarding the defendant’s reputation
for peacefulness in the context

of Violent and malicious attacks allegedly instigated by the

defendant under relatively normal circumstances.

That

is,

each addresses the admissibility of

such testimony in the context 0f true crimes of Violence and conduct that
reputation for peacefulness one might earn in the

5

Stone does discuss State

V.

is

clearly contrary t0 the

community under normal circumstances.

Dobbins, 102 Idaho 706, 639 P.2d 4 (1981), but acknowledges that

Dobbins does not address the issue here. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) While Dobbins involved
testimony regarding the defendant’s reputation for peacefulness in an aggravated battery case,
there

was no objection

Instead, the issue

brief, p.16.)

the Witness

“to the defendant’s use of such general character evidence.” (Appellant’s

was asked

t0

was Whether

name speciﬁc

the lower court properly sustained an objection

individuals

defendant was allegedly reputed as peaceful.
result, there is
6

None of

making up the community amongst

Dobbins, 102 Idaho

at

whom the

707, 639 P.2d at

n0 discussion regarding the nature 0f the alleged criminal conduct

When

5.

As

a

in Dobbins.

these cases apply a rule like I.R.E. 404(a)(2), but instead apply case law in those

jurisdictions.

11

If

someone

0r shot

would

Stone had instigated a ﬁght outside of a bar, pistol-Whipped a stranger during a robbery,

likely

different.

in the course

of an ordinary argument, then her reputation for peacefulness

be relevant to her prosecution for

But the

that conduct.7

facts here are dramatically

These were anything but ordinary circumstance and testimony regarding a reputation

for peacefulness under ordinary circumstances

that Stone intended her foot t0 contact

fact at issue in the case

more 0r

Nurse Gonzales

less probable.

crime, two undisputed facts in particular

Stone’s reputation for peaceﬁllness

would not

any way contravene the proposition

here.

Along with

show

was not

in

It

would

therefore not

make any

is

a general intent

that the district court correctly

concluded that

the fact that battery

probative: (1) that she

was

inebriated and (2) that she

believed she was being wrongfully detained and was attempting to escape her captors.

During

was not

all

of the events

at issue here,

Stone was inebriated, was unsteady on her

acting “very rational.” (TL, p.166, Ls.5-8; p.175, L.21

later testiﬁed that she

had taken enough Ambien and alcohol

was one 0f the only times she had ever blacked
9.)

It

was Stone’s

and

L.4; p.200, Ls.5-21.)

She

that she “blacked out,”

(Tr., p.3 19,

and

that this

L.18 — p.320, L25; p.326, Ls.3-

obligation to provide an offer of proof sufﬁcient t0 establish the relevance of

the testimony she sought to admit.

Mar. 20, 2020).

out.

— p.177,

feet,

State V. Hayes,

Stone’s offer of proof

was only

No. 47324, 2020

WL

1327216,

t0 provide testimony that she

at

*11 (Idaho

had a “general

reputation or general character traits for peacefulness.” (TL, p.233, Ls.19-22.) She did not offer

to provide

to

any testimony regarding her reputation for peacefulness While inebriated. In addition

being inebriated, Stone was being held against her will—on a police hold the legitimacy of

Which has never been

at

issue—by members of

the hospital staff, including

Nurse Gonzales.

(TL, p.210, Ls.1 1-13.) In opening, Stone’s attorney painted a picture 0f Stone attempting to get

7

Of course even then the

district court

could exclude the testimony under Rule 403.

12

out 0f her bed and room, contact her family, but being thwarted by multiple staff

“grabbing” and “get[ting] aggressive” with her as she
L.5

— p.138,

L.24.)

As

“is

obviously trying to

resist.”

that Stone

“wanted

to leave”

and was “aggressive

room,” she was “resistant” to attempts
staff,

and she required physical

the room,

which physical

p.184, L.20

—

Gonzales,

was a

it

(TL, p.135,

her attorney also argued, Stone did not want t0 be touched and, “[i]f she

doesn’t want t0 be touched, she’s going t0 try to get away.” (TL, p.246, Ls.1-17.)

was

members

in trying t0 get off the

bed and leave the

t0 get her to stay in her bed, aggressive

restraint

The testimony

towards hospital

by Nurse Gonzales and

others to keep her from leaving

(TL, p.166, L.13

— p.167, L25; p.179, Ls.17-24;

restraint she resisted.

p.185, L.17; p.203, Ls.16-21; p.265, Ls.2-10.)

Even

after she

kicked

at

Nurse

“struggle” to restrain Stone and she continued t0 ﬁght until staff could place

her in physical restraints and sedate her. (TL, p.170, Ls.3-9; p.267, L.2

—

p.268, L.18.)

she does not speciﬁcally recall the events, Stone later testiﬁed that she believed she

Though

was

likely

“anxious” because she was “in an unfamiliar place” and was “unaware of What [was] going 0n,”
that she

[her]

was

“try[ing] t0 get out

house and there’s

The

of the situation,” and that she

may have

believed she was “at

strangers there.” (Tr., p.330, Ls.1 1-21.)

[sic]

central issue as

framed by the parties was simply Whether Stone intended

contact with Nurse Gonzales under those circumstances, while she believed she

t0

make

was being

wrongfully held against her Will and was being physically restrained, Which physical restraint she

was

resisting,

and While she was inebriated. As the

hold, but did not

want

t0 stay

on her bed or

state

argued in opening, Stone was 0n police

in her hospital

room, and when hospital

staff “tried to

keep her 0n the bed,” she “kicked Miss Gonzales in the face.” (TL, p.129, Ls.15-20.) The
argued that because battery

is

a general intent crime,

contact, not that Stone acted maliciously or

was

it

needed only

to

trying to hurt anyone.

13

state

prove that she intended the

(Tr.,

p.144, L.20

— p.145,

Stone argued that the contact was accidental, though she intentionally resisted the

L.18.)

attempts of hospital staff t0 restrain her. (TL, p.137, L.21

Under those

given those arguments, evidence that Stone has a reputation for

facts,

peacefulness under ordinary circumstances

She was

inebriated,

was

trying to leave,

not want t0 be touched.

that Stone

Who were

not probative With respect t0 any disputed issue.

is

was being physically detained

Those are not the ordinary circumstances

With Which a reputation for peacefulness

any way

— p.139, L23.)

would not

is

in

against her will, and did

Which one develops and

concerned, and such a reputation does not suggest in

“resist” in part

by making physical contact with

physically and “aggressively” detaining her against her Wi11.8

the individuals

Likewise, the fact that

Stone was inebriated and not in her right mind further supports the View that testimony about her
reputation for peacefulness

circumstances,

when

she

is

was

irrelevant here.

sober, provides

unusual circumstances and While she

is

Her reputation

n0 evidentiary value

under normal

as t0 her behavior in these

highly inebriated.

Idaho Code § 18-903 provides that a battery

(a)

for peacefulness

is

any:

Willful and unlawful use of force 0r Violence

upon

the person 0f another;

0r

(b)

Actual, intentional and unlawful touching 0r striking of another person
against the will of the other; or

(c)

The

district court correctly

crime in

8

Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual.9

that,

recognized that battery under either

(a) or (b) is

a “general intent”

while the defendant must intentionally use force upon the person of another,

Stone afﬁrmatively disclaimed reliance 0n self—defense as a defense in this case.

C“

'

1t is

(TL, p.245,

Ls.19-23.)
9

Idaho Code § 18-915C—criminalizing battery 0n a health care worker and under which Stone
was prosecuted—refers back t0 Idaho Code § 18-903 for the deﬁnition 0f “battery.”
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not necessary that the defendant
injury.”’ (TL, p.151,

“interdicted act”

that the act is illegal 0r intend that

L.17 — p.153, L.8 (quoting State

470, 473 (Ct. App. 2002).)

App. 2000) (holding

know

E

caused bodily

137 Idaho 827, 830, 54 P.3d

also State V. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 400, 3 P.3d 67, 78 (Ct.

that battery

must be done

V. Billings,

it

under LC.

§ 18-903(a) is a general intent crime).

intentionally, that act is the “use

Though

the

0f force or Violence” 0r the

“unlaWﬁJI touching or striking” 0f another, no matter the defendant’s reason, goals, or knowledge
regarding the lawfulness 0f the

Mg;

137 Idaho

at

act,

and Without regarding

830-31, 54 P.3d at 473-74.

t0 his intent 0r motivations.

The defendant who has committed a

m

battery

need not be acting maliciously, out of a Violent or quarrelsome character, 0r With a goal of
hurting anyone, but could instead, for example, simply be trying “to get away” in a threatening

and confusing

situation,

held against her will.

the statute.

individual

As

while in an altered and inebriated

state,

Such use 0f force and such touching

and where the defendant

as in this case,

what Miss Stone

is

being

Will nevertheless be a battery under

the district court correctly found, “commit[ting] a battery

by doing,

is

accused of doing”

is

on a healthcare
not contrary to

having a reputation as “a peaceful person” as a general matter and under normal circumstances.
(TL, p.154, Ls.5-8.)

m

334 (1995) (holding

that testimony regarding a reputation for peacefulness

People

V.

Carron, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1241, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328,

charge that did not require intent to injure or

less

probable that Stone intended to

make

kill).

was not

relevant to

Such a reputation does not make

forceful contact With

it

more or

Nurse Gonzales under these

circumstances.

Stone faults the
(per curiam).

district court for citing State V. Bailey,

117 Idaho 941

(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21 (citing Tr., p.154, Ls.3-8).)

(Ct.

App. 1990)

In Ba_iley, the Court 0f

Appeals held that a defendant’s reputation for drinking in moderation was irrelevant to a charge

15

of driving under the inﬂuence because “a defendant
nevertheless be guilty” 0f driving under the inﬂuence.

Who

is

only a moderate drinker

117 Idaho

Ba_iley,

at 943.

Citing

may

m,

the district court noted that, just as the apparent relevance 0f a reputation for moderate drinking

was

illusory in that case, likewise the apparent relevance

illusory

under the

facts

of

this case

of Stone’s reputation for peacefulness

and the nature 0f the charge.

On

While the reputation for moderate drinking in Ba_iley “would not have
defendant]

make

had the

But as discussed above,

requisite state of

that alleged

cases, the reputation testimony at issue

charges.

was

In Ba_iley, whether the defendant

made

may d0

so.

mind

it

for a battery.”

and conclusory distinction
irrelevant in light

of the

is

facts

was a moderate drinker was

Whether he had consumed enough alcohol

even moderate drinking

appeal, Stone argues that

less likely that [the

the reputation for peacefulness 0r non-Violence in this case

less likely that [Stone]

it

p.21.)

was impaired,”

117 Idaho

at

“would

(Appellant’s brief,

non-existent.

In both

and the nature of the

irrelevant to the question

t0 “perceptibly impair[] his driving ability”

Ba_iley,

is

943, 792 P.2d at 968.

The

because

state

had

t0

prove only impaired driving, not the more aggravating allegation that Bailey was highly
inebriated..

Likewise, Whether Stone had a reputation for peaceﬁllness was irrelevant to the

question Whether she intended a physical contact in a situation in Which she believed she

essentially defending herself

intentional

and while she was inebriated.

and forceful contact

in the latter circumstance, not the

The

had

was

to

prove only

more aggravating

fact that she

state

maliciously or Violently attacked someone under normal circumstance.

The

district

court correctly recognized that testimony about Stone’s reputation for

peacefulness under ordinary circumstances
t0 “get

is

not probative as t0 Whether she would resist and try

away,” including by intentionally making forceful contact, When inebriated and while

16

resisting being physically restrained against her will in

an unfamiliar place by people that she did

not know. The court therefore properly excluded the testimony.

If The District

D.

Court Erred, The Error

Was Harmless

“‘A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based
the duty t0 establish that such an error occurred, at

demonstrating that the error

is

Which point the

harmless beyond a reasonable d0ubt.”’ State

Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (quoting State
“‘[T]he error

974 (2010)).

without the error.”

(2013)).

Very

that

is

harmless

an error

if the

Li. (quoting State V.

recently, in State V. Garcia,

Supreme Court clariﬁed

the Idaho

is

harmless

this

if the result

clariﬁed that determining Whether that

V. Per_ry,

at

Montgomery, 163

150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256

Docket No. 46253 (Idaho April 28, 2020) (non-ﬁnal),

harmless error analysis.

would have been
is

V.

have the burden 0f

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same

the

While

it

remains correct to say

same absent

the error, the Court

so requires a weighing of the “probative force 0f the

error” against “[t]he probative force 0f evidence untainted

Docket No. 46253,

State shall

have

error shall

by

error against a defendant.”

GLcia,

*13. In Garcia, the Court held that an error in admitting certain testimony

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt Where

the state presented “signiﬁcant and substantial

evidence” With respect t0 the pertinent issue and the “probative force of this [properly admitted]
evidence
*13-14.

.

.

.

ﬂ

weigh[ed] heavily against the force of the erroneously admitted testimony.” Li
also State V. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 712,

(holding that erroneous exclusion 0f evidence

316 P.3d 117, 124

was harmless Where

and the properly admitted evidence with respect

to the

same

issue

its

(Ct.

strong).

was

Even

error t0 exclude testimony regarding Stone’s reputation for peacefulness, the error

17

App. 2013)

probative value

was

at

if

slight

it

was

was harmless

Assuming

beyond any reasonable doubt.

that the evidence

was

relevant at

the probative

all,

value of that evidence was vanishingly slight and the properly admitted evidence concerning

Whether Stone intended

With respect

t0

make

forceful contact With

t0 the probative value

in the previous section

shows

represented that the testimony

speciﬁc acts,” and would be “quite brief.”
not in circumstances that would

She was

probative.

in

t0

was very

slight if

it

was

relevant at

all.

Stone

be “just general reputation,” Without “going into

(TL, p.143, L.13

make testimony

that she

—

Again, Stone was

p.144, L.13.)

had a reputation

for peacefulness

an unfamiliar place, being held against her Will and physically restrained

by unfamiliar people, While she was so
trying to get away.

strong.

0f the excluded reputation testimony, the discussion

that the value

was going

Nurse Gonzales was very

Testimony

little—in fact, as argued above,

inebriated as to be blacked out, and she

was

resisting

and

that Stone is a generally peaceful person provides extremely

no—reason

t0 believe that, while resisting

and trying

t0 get

away,

she would refrain from making any physical contact With the persons she believed were

wrongfully detaining her.

On

the other side of the ledger, the evidence that Stone intentionally kicked at

Nurse

Gonzales was very strong. State’s EX. 2 clearly shows Stone contorting her body towards Nurse
Gonzales,

who was

standing above Stone’s waist

then repeatedly kicking at Nurse Gonzales.
the Video

was conﬁrmed through

when Stone was moved back

the testimony at

trial.

not appear to be merely trying to get her feet to the ﬂoor
that her feet

were “directed”

at

Nurse Gonzales.

(Tr.,

aimed her kicks

at

Nurse Gonzales.

(Tr.,

18

10:52.)

What

Ofﬁcer Schatz testiﬁed

when

made

is

obvious in

that Stone did

she kicked Nurse Gonzales, but

p.212, L.25

testiﬁed that Stone kicked at Nurse Gonzales three times,

that Stone

—

(State’s EX. 2, 10:47

onto the bed, and

—

p.215, L.16.)

Kody Wright

contact With her face twice, and

p.266, Ls.21

— p.267,

L.8; p.312, Ls.12-17.)

Nurse Gonzales testiﬁed

up

t0 her chest,

that she

pushed her

feet

was standing above Stone’s waist When Stone pulled her

upwards, and kicked her in the face twice.

(Tr.,

legs

p.168, L.22

—

p.169, L.13.)

That Stone intended to kick Nurse Gonzales
to

and

after

doing

and did not want
staff to

so.

As

t0 stay

discussed above, Stone

further substantiated

made

it

clear that she

on her bed. She aggressively and angrily

keep her in the room and return her

Ls.17-24; p.184, L.20

is

to her bed.

wanted

to leave the

room

resisted the efforts of hospital

(TL, p.166, L.13

— p.185, L.17; p.203, Ls.16-21; p.265,

by her behavior prior

—

p.167,

L25; p.179,

Ls.2-10.) In the minutes before she

kicked Nurse Gonzales, she repeatedly called hospital staff members, including Nurse Gonzales,
“bitches” and aggressively tried t0

move towards Nurse

Both Nurse Gonzales and Ofﬁcer Schatz testiﬁed
Ls.13-20; p.173, L.18

Gonzales. (State’s EX.

that Stone

— p.174, L.10; p.203, L.15 — p.204,

was threatening

L.12.)

be reﬂected in State’s EX.

Nurse Gonzales, she continued
(State’s EX.

1,

1

at

t0 use profanity to refer t0

00:01 — 01 :25.)

staff.

(Tr.,

Ofﬁcer Schatz testiﬁed

threatened t0 throw her shoe at Nurse Gonzales. (TL, p.208, Ls.3-21.)
cuts out, that threat appears to

1,

Though

p.166,

that she

the audio brieﬂy

00:12 — 00:24. After she kicked

Nurse Gonzales and hospital

staff.

02:10 — 02:40.) She continued to ﬁght until she could be strapped to the bed and

sedated, requiring as

p.268, L.18; EX.

1,

many

as eight hospital staff to

01:20 — 05:40; EX.

2,

10:45

—

do

so.

13:50.)

(TL, p.170, Ls.3-9; p.267, L.2

—

Stone hardly appeared “peaceful”

during the events at issue.

Nor was

there any evidence to suggest that Stone did not intentionally kick

Nurse

Gonzales. Indeed, Stone did not even testify that she did not. Stone acknowledged that she was
angry, confused, anxious, did not understand

get away, and that she

may have

Why

she

was

there, that she

was

trying to leave

believed the hospital staff were intruders in her home.
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and
(TL,

p.330, Ls.2-21.)

Though she speculated

that she

would not have

intentionally kicked

Gonzales, she also acknowledged that she was “blacked out” and so did not
0r Why. (Tr., p.333, L.22

— p.335,

if

she did

L.12.)

The properly admitted evidence strongly suggests
Gonzales, even

know what

Nurse

that Stone intentionally kicked

Nurse

only in an attempt to escape the situation. The testimony that Stone claims was

improperly excluded was,

at best,

of only very

slight probative value.

There

is

n0 reasonable

doubt that any error in excluding that testimony was harmless.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm Stone’s judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this 6th day 0f May, 2020.
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